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Academics and policy makers have increasingly recognised the importance of mundane economic 
activities – variously termed foundational or everyday – by academics and policy makers. The 
foundational or everyday economy is now featuring in local industrial strategy and economic action 
plans, because the desirable high-tech sectors on the ‘frontier’ cannot diffuse prosperity within and 
between regions. This paper aims to distinguish between several different approaches to the 
foundational or everyday economy and argues that a constructive approach needs to break with the 
preoccupation about improving productivity. This argument is developed in three stages. First, we 
distinguish between a social approach and a more technical economic approach to delimiting this 
other mundane economy; the defining feature of the foundational in the social approach is 
contribution to wellbeing and in the technical economic approach it is low productivity. The second 
section presents and explores productivity evidence on output per worker hour across a range of 
foundational activities and by region. Drawing out the implications of observed diversity and 
heterogeneity, the third section develops an argument about how productivity has limited relevance 
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Academics, policy makers and politicians have increasingly recognised the limits of traditional  
industrial policy focused on the tradable goods and services sectors, especially ‘frontier’ industries. 
This emphasis ignores the larger, ‘other’ mundane part of most economies, including industries 
providing essential goods and services variously termed the foundational or everyday economy.  If 
these other sectors have demand and supply side importance, industrial policy needs to be about 
more than promoting early stage innovation and supporting growth in exciting and high-tech sectors. 
At the same time, the latest incarnation of UK industrial strategy retains the traditional concern with 
improving productivity (BEIS, 2017). This is now a response to the so-called productivity puzzle in the 
UK economy (Haldane, 2018), and the UK’s relatively poor productivity performance compared with 
other countries, especially since the 2008 financial crisis (Mason et al., 2018). And the objective of 
improving productivity across the economy, does now highlight the large, low wage sectors of retail 
and hospitality (JRF, 20xx; ONS, 2017; IPPR, 2018), alongside a broader place-based focus on what are 
considered as under-performing regions (Teow and Reilly, 2019).  
 
This paper responds to these developments by distinguishing between different understandings of 
the other economy as everyday or foundational, and by questioning the relevance of industrial or 
regional policy focused on productivity in mundane activities. If we are to identify distinctive activities 
of the economy that are important for everyday life and develop policies to support and sustain them, 
this requires some clarity about how we define and characterise these sectors both collectively and 
individually. The original definition of the foundational broke with the idea of a singular economy (the 
economy) and argued  there are multiple economies or zones of activities with different 
characteristics. The foundational economy is the zone that produces the daily essential services that 
are the infrastructure of civilised life (Bentham et al., 2013; Foundational Economy Collective, 2018). 
These include both material services that provide housing, transport, food, energy, water and 
telecoms; and providential services providing, health, care and education. The term ‘everyday 
economy’ has subsequently been used in related but distinctive ways to mean either important 
everyday and local services (Reeves, 2018) or more narrowly, low wage sectors including retail, 
hospitality and care (IPPR 2018).  
 
The differences in definition are important because they reflect distinct underlying conceptualisations 
of the ‘other’ mundane economy and how it matters: specifically is the categorisation to be based on 
social value (i.e. essential services) or economic  performance (i.e. low wage, low productivity)? This 
category distinction is relevant because it spills over into policy differences: does the everyday or 
foundational economy require radical new policy levers to address new  objects, or a more 
incremental approach that transposes old policy levers and objects into a new activity domain? We 
can observe this difference of approach in the UK. The Welsh Government has explicit foundational 
economy policies which directly target liveability and sustainability through better essential services 
provided by local grounded firms (Waters, 2020). While Greater Manchester’s local industrial strategy 
(GMCA, 2019a) aims to work indirectly through raising productivity to allow higher wages and living 
standards, especially in ‘low wage’ sectors like retail and care.  
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This article contributes to the debate in this emerging area and has two aims. First, the aim is to  clarify 
and organise understanding of the differences in how the foundational and everyday economies are 
defined and delimited in current debate. Second, the aim is to evaluate the assumption made in some 
of the literature and policy that foundational/everyday activities are characterised by low productivity; 
this critical evaluation of evidence leads to argument about the limited relevance of productivity 
measures in foundational activities. The article has three sections: the first focuses on the categories 
outlines through which the foundational/ everyday economy categories and its policy relevance is 
understood; the second focuses on the empirics of foundational  productivity, exploring the patterns 
of difference between activities and regions; and the third critically discusses the utility and relevance 
of higher productivity as a focus for industrial and regional policy on the foundational/ everyday 
economy. 
 
The foundational economy as a focus for industrial policy 
Since Peter Mandelson resurrected the idea of industrial policy in the UK after the great financial crisis, 
the focus of Westminster government policy has been on exciting, high-tech, innovative, tradeable 
sectors, described by Stanley (2020) as the ‘fetish of the frontier’. The UK’s 2017 White Paper on 
industrial strategy (BEIS, 2017) included sector deals and the encouragement of early stage innovation 
in activities like life sciences, aerospace and automotive. At the same time, there has been growing 
awareness that industrial and regional strategy focused on high-tech and innovative sectors offers 
limited leverage over output and employment because the numbers employed in these activities are 
relatively small (Bentham et al., 2013). This observation leads to the issues addressed in this section 
of the paper: what is the ‘other’ economy i.e. what lies beyond these tradable goods and services 
sectors; how can this part of the economy be characterised and how can public policy be used to 
support these sectors.  
Taking the UK economy as a whole, 44% of employment is the tradeable goods and services sectors 
(Foundational Economy Collective, 2017). This total includes activities like automotive, 
pharmaceuticals, IT and digital etc; but,  within this large and diverse group, a relatively small part is 
accounted for by high tech and innovative sectors. As noted by Fothergill et al (2017), only 10.9% of 
British manufacturing employment (and 1.4% of all employment) would be covered by industrial 
strategy challenge funds announced in 2017. It should not be a surprise that the economy of the UK  
comprises much more than tradeable goods and services; but it is only recently that there have been 
attempts to understand and explore the characteristics and nature of this other economy and its 
relevance to policy.  
We can highlight several distinctive approaches to what is referred to variously as the foundational or 
the everyday economy. To do so requires some discussion of the categories and policy focus which 
define new objects; and this is useful because it also focuses questions about problem definitions and 
policy. An important emerging point of difference is about the extent to which diagnosis and remedy 
should focus on productivity in the foundational/ everyday economy as an enabler of higher wages 
and living standards; by way of contrast a more direct approach focuses on the social value of the 
services produced by the foundational economy and their contribution to well-being.  
The term foundational economy was originally introduced by Bentham et al. (2013) to propose and 
develop a new policy object and radical approach. The foundational economy is defined as the group 
of heterogeneous activities delivering goods and services which meet essential citizen needs and 
Accepted and forthcoming in Local Economy August 2020 




provide the infrastructure of everyday life. The activities that comprise this foundational economy2 
are manifestly heterogeneous and will change at the margins over time as both needs and context 
evolve. For example, the internet is now essential for access to many services and, for some, to access 
their ‘work’, just as transportation systems allow others to access physical work and leisure spaces. 
The broad range of foundational services can be organised into distinctive material activities (utilities 
and other networks) and providential activities (health, education and care) (Foundational Economy 
Collective, 2018).  
Not only do these serve essential daily household needs, they are often collectively provided and 
individuals may not be able to easily or efficiently secure them through individual consumption. If the 
foundational economy has this central relevance in demand and supply side terms, the policy issues 
raised relate to how the supply of essential goods and services is shaped not only by activity specifics 
– such as requirement for capital investment - but also by business models driven by capital market 
requirements for financial returns. Here, a distinctive approach to business analysis draws on reports 
on adult care (Burns et al., 2016a and 2016b) with case studies of retail banking, telecoms and 
broadband and supermarkets/ dairy (Bowman et al., 2014). Such studies help explain – though do not 
justify - low wages and poor conditions in some of these activities. 
In the context of Covid-19, this foundational economy overlaps to a large extent with those activities 
where ‘key workers’ have  been required to keep working, regardless of additional risk to themselves, 
because of the essential nature of the services delivered (Farquharson et al., 2020). From this point of 
view, the Foundational Economy Collective also identifies an outer, external zone - an overlooked 
economy - providing culturally important goods and services which, while not essential for daily life, 
are occasionally purchased and both important to well-being and largely overlooked by industrial 
policy. These activities – hairdressing, takeaways and tourist accommodation and attractions– are 
large employers though their expansion can also be the object of citizen complaint. After the first wave 
of the pandemic initially passed in mid-2020, much of the concern has been about whether and how 
large parts of the over-looked economy - in personal services like hairdressing or gyms, or the 
hospitality and visitor economy - could be reopened to meet demand and prevent massive loss of jobs 
and small businesses in these sectors. 
Even before Covid-19 spotlighted key workers, the foundational economy analysis has had policy 
resonance in Wales. After twenty years of devolved government, the Welsh Government had failed in 
its declared objective of closing the GVA gap with England (Stokes, 2019) and inward investment has 
not resulted in a new, tradeable sectors to compensate for the collapse of coal, steel and light 
manufacturing (Brill et al., 2015). Over time, this has been reflected in an increased willingness by 
Welsh Government to try new policies. This began in a limited way with an Economic Action Plan in 
2017 which continued Welsh Government’s sectoral approach to economic policy and added four 
‘foundation sectors’ of tourism, food, retail and care (Welsh Government, 2017a). This was also picked 
up in the Valleys Task Force delivery plan (Welsh Government, 2017b) 
Under a new Deputy Minister for Economy and Transport, Lee Waters, the approach was broadened 
(Waters, 2019) and connected with the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act (2015) 
commitment to well-being, so that policy was refocused on liveability and sustainability through the 
improved supply of essential goods and services delivered by grounded firms. The new minister 
explicitly challenged any idea of a Foundational Economy ‘being characterised by low skills and 
productivity’ adding that ‘we don’t simply want to grow these parts of the economy, we want to 
 
2 For a classification of sectors with 5-digit SIC and 4-digit NACE codes see: 
https://foundationaleconomy.com/activity-classification/ 
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disrupt them - to change and improve how they work’ (Waters, 2020).  The Welsh interventions so far 
are cautious: mainstream economic policies have not been renounced, while new policies are about 
experimental learning by doing (Waters, 2020). For example: a challenge fund is sponsoring 52 
experiments with the ambition of building communities of practice; a purchasing for social value 
initiative is being organised through the Public Service Boards, with local authorities under pressure 
to develop relational procurement; and small business support is being rethought and reorganised 
(Business Wales, 2019).  
In a parallel development to this emerging policy in Wales, Rachel Reeves MP (Reeves, 2018; 2019) 
and Stanley (2020) in a pamphlet for Nesta have set out arguments about recognising the significance 
of foundational economy sectors for both employment and community well-being reasons. Reeves’ 
starting point is explicitly social in a Polanyian way when she argues that ‘capitalism has been allowed 
to expand into sectors of society where markets should not belong’ (Reeves, 2018, p. 26). Stanley 
(2020) is concerned with ‘reproductive labour’, provides a critique of financialised business models 
and envisages a reform of care which is less about bio-medical needs and more about meeting the 
social needs of the workforce. From this point of view, Reeves and Stanley operate with a similar long 
list of activities as the Foundational Economy Collective (2018). Reeves adds the supplementary that 
some of these foundational activities are low wage: ‘core (foundational) activities include transport, 
child care and adult care, health, education, utilities, broadband, social benefits and the low-wage 
sectors of hospitality, retail, food processing and distribution’ (Reeves, 2018, p.10). For both Reeves 
and Stanley, the activities they highlight are defined as complex in social and economic terms: the 
goods and services produced have intrinsic social value, especially in a local context and work is about 
quality and dignity as much as an input-output ratio.  
In contrast, there has also been development of interest in another ‘everyday economy’, where 
inclusion of the activity in the everyday category is based not on the essential nature of the services 
provided but on their characterisation as low productivity. Here, the singular economy survives and 
the view is more orthodox: the economy is not a social body beset by financialisation or a complex 
place-based set of local, essential services because in the orthodox view the economy is a machine 
where low productivity activities are a problem because it leads to low wages. This framing reflects 
the long-established concerns of some economists who have, since the Anglo-American Council on 
Productivity in the early 1950s, problematised the UK’s national productivity gap first in comparison 
with the USA and later with France and Germany (Broadberry and O’Mahony, 2004). These concerns 
have been recently reinforced by a mainstream panic about productivity  after the stalling of 
productivity gains (and stagnation of labour productivity) since 2008 (see, for example, Haldane, 2018; 
ONS, 2018). This fed into the UK Industrial Strategy White Paper and its concerns to strengthen the 
‘five foundations’ of productivity to allow a ‘transformation of the economy’ (BEIS, 2017, p.14). While 
the UK industrial strategy reflects general concerns about productivity (cite), other publications have 
carried over the productivity challenge into the outer, other areas of the economy. 
The low productivity characterisation of foundational/ everyday activities can be seen in several 
places. As part of the IPPR Economic Justice Commission, Jacobs et al. (2017) introduced the 
distinction between ‘frontier sectors’ and ‘the everyday economy where the vast majority of low 
productivity and low wage firms are to be found’. This list includes ‘retail and wholesale, social care, 
tourism and hospitality, food and drink and light manufacturing’. Notably, the foundational activities 
of utility supply, retail banking, health and education are not included so that the ‘everyday’ is defined 
in a short list, narrower way compared to Reeves (2018). A similar framing has been incorporated into 
formal designs for city region industrial strategy in Greater Manchester: in 2019, the Local Industrial 
Strategy insisted that the central policy measure of success was higher productivity which ‘should 
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continue to be the key to future evaluation and monitoring of progress towards Industrial Strategy 
goals’ (GMCA, 2019a). The Greater Manchester strategy reiterates the distinction between frontier 
and foundational sectors and declares the aim is ‘to raise productivity and pay’ in retail, care, 
hospitality and tourism. There are no specifics about what to do in these sectors which differ from 
each other in every respect except low pay. The recommendation is for long term ‘efforts to support 
the development of new business models and more effective service integration and management 
practice’; and short term voluntary adherence to GM’s ‘good employment charter’ (GMCA, 2019a).  
This difference of framing raises a question: is the other economy of mundane activities to be viewed 
primarily as socially important or economically deficient? The answer is policy relevant because it has 
implications for policy thinking about ends and means. For example, should the priority be direct 
service improvement, including through new policies of social licensing for corporate providers 
(Bowman et al., 2014; Reeves, 2018), or should policy aim to raise productivity and increase wages as 
the way to higher living standards? Of course, the approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
for example, in the care sector, service improvements could involve re-organising work in ways that 
also improved pay and conditions. But there is a choice here because, for example, productivity 
improvements could be pursued through limiting personal contact time of workers with users and 
delivering inferior service as a consequence.  
Given the intellectual and political support for reading the mundane other economy through the lens 
of a pre-existing productivity  problem definition, it is important to understand the productivity 
performance of the heterogeneous activities within the foundational economy. This provides an 
empirical basis for discussing the relevance of policy geared to raising productivity in that other 
economy. The next section of the paper explores the first of these issues: what is the mix of high, low 
and middling productivity activities in the foundational economy activities; and what is the extent of 
regional variation? This allows informed discussion of the relevance of productivity to the foundational 
in the final section of the paper. 
 
 
The productivity of foundational activities 
The recent concern about the UK’s productivity problem is manifest in reports that outline patterns 
of underperformance on either a regional (Teow and Reilly, 2019, for PWC) or an industry (IPPR, 2018) 
basis. A study by Forth and Rincon Aznar (2018) for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation provides some 
in-depth analysis which discloses heterogeneity even within ‘low wage’ sectors; the authors note for 
example that productivity in retail has been rising. Forth and Rincon Aznar’s conclusions are a caution 
against loose generalisation about sectors. Hence the importance of the granular evidence in this 
section about levels and differences in productivity by activity and region within the UK’s (broadly 
defined) foundational economy sectors.  
Productivity is commonly measured as output (GVA) per worker hour. In this section we use UK data 
from the ONS (Office for National Statistics) which provides a breakdown of productivity by activity 
and by region. This is the standard source, used inter alia by Jacobs et al (2017) and GMCA (2019b)3 to 
compare sectors and by McCann (2019) amongst others to compare regions.4 Table 1 presents 
 
3 GMCA (2019b) use GVA per full time equivalent employee, rather than per hour worked. 
4 The ONS also produces total factor productivity estimates but these are aggregated for the UK and cover only 
the ‘market sector’, therefore they do not allow a comparison across a range of sectors and regions: 
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productivity per worker hour for a sample of foundational economy activities by region and nation in 
2017; this includes material activities – utilities, construction, food & drink retailing and transport – 
and providential activities – education, health and care (residential and non-residential care) – with a 
benchmark of all industries. The table does not cover all foundational activities, with some - like the 
postal service and retail pharmacies - excluded; hospitality is also excluded because that is an 
overlooked activity which is more difficult to measure using SIC codes as it is dispersed over several 
categories.  
The sample of foundational activities included is large enough to cover 75% of foundational 
employment in England and 66% in Wales and Scotland. Some of the figures have been estimated as 
the ONS does not provide a sufficient disaggregation by sector to match the foundational economy 
categories. In two cases – banking and food & drink retailing - we have subdivided ONS categories; 
and in two other cases – utilities and transport – we have amalgamated ONS categories. The 
estimation methods used in these cases are explained in the Appendix. The complication of hours 
worked is dealt with by crediting all full-time workers (including the self-employed) with a 36-hour 
week and part-time workers with a 16-hour week, over a 52-week year; the short hours allow for 
holidays and statutory days. Productivity estimations require choices; those made here are applied 
consistently to all activities and allow comparison of productivity between sectors. 
[insert table 1 and table 2 about here]  
From table 1 several observations can be made. First, this sample of foundational activities cannot be 
fairly characterised as low productivity overall because output per worker hour is only fractionally 
behind the all-industry average. In the case of England (including London), mean output per worker 
hour is £36.20 for the foundational activities, against £38.47 for all industries. In terms of spatial 
differences, the gap is 5-11% in the case of Wales, Scotland and English regions, with the exception of 
the south east; in London, the high value added activity mix ensures that there is no productivity gap 
at all and output per worker hour in this group of foundational activities is almost exactly equal to the 
London all economy figure.  
Of course, an average can hide many differences and these foundational sectors are heterogeneous 
in terms of productivity. Taking the figures for England, for example, the two largest foundational 
activities in terms of employment and output are health and education, which separately account for 
5-6% of all English GVA and 7-8% of all English employment.5 Both health and education have below 
average productivity with output of around £29 per hour against £38 per worked hour for all English 
activities (table 1).  Beyond this, the range from high to low is quite spectacular: from £102 per worker 
hour in utilities to £13 per worker hour in residential care in England; in between, there is banking at 
£96 per hour, construction at £59 per hour and transport at £41 per hour. In terms of productivity, as 
in so many other respects, foundational economy activities are a mosaic and, as a group, they cannot 
be assigned to one side of a binary division between high and low productivity.      
Second, in many of the large foundational economy activities, there is no large productivity gap on 
average between deindustrialised regions of the North and West and the all-England average 




5 In this section, data on the significance of each industry sector comes from the quarterly Business Register 
and Employment Survey (BRES): 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforbusinesses/businesssurveys/businessregisterandemployment
survey 
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of foundational activities with productivity levels in the North East, Yorkshire & Humberside and Wales 
(table 2). This is an exacting test because the all-England total includes London, which is in many ways 
unlike the rest of the UK. In six out of nine foundational activities in Wales, output per worker hour is 
88% or more of the all-England performance6; for Yorkshire & Humberside it is five of nine sectors and 
in the North East four of nine. Large numbers are employed in education, health and care where there 
is no regional gap; these activities account for 28.5% of the total Welsh workforce, 22.1% of the total 
Yorkshire & Humberside workforce and 21.7% of the total North East workforce7. 
The absence of a regional productivity gap in such activities is not surprising when many private and 
public foundational activities like food retailing, health and care are organised in much the same way 
across the UK. Tax funded activities such as health and education have financial inputs allocated 
according to per capita formulae which have a rough equalising effect. The position in care reflects 
the widespread misery of underfunding as care expenditure grows to claim an ever-increasing share 
of local authority spend. Any discussion of regional productivity differences (such as that produced by 
Teow and Reilly, 2019) should start by acknowledging the absence of any regional gap in so many 
foundational activities; subsequent inquiry could then usefully focus on the foundational activities 
where a gap exists and also on the activity characteristics and drivers of productivity in overlooked 
services and tradeable goods. 
While there is no regional productivity gap in most foundational activities in table 1, there is a large 
gap in some sectors, supporting the characterisation of foundational activities as heterogeneous in 
terms of narrow economic performance. In four foundational activities there is a large productivity 
gap between London and the outer deindustrialised regions of the North and West. In these activities 
- financial services, construction, food and drink retailing and transport - London’s productivity per 
worker hour is between 55 and 185% higher than in Wales, the North East or Yorkshire & Humberside. 
In construction and financial services, London’s productivity per worker hour is consistently around 
twice as high as in any of these regions.  
Why should there be such a large gap? In at least three of these activities (finance, transport and 
construction), the nature of the activity varies regionally, unlike education and health where task and 
organisation are similar across the UK. For example, London is a national and international transport 
hub and a city dependent on radial commuting, so that it accounts for 31% of GB value added in 
transport. In construction, London accounts for 27% of GB value added and London construction jobs, 
trade organisation and property values are very different from those in Wales or North East England. 
The activity differences here are such that a productivity gap in these activities is inevitable and 
emulation of London is not a relevant, sensible objective for the North East or Wales. The more 
important point is that, in these activities, there is little or no productivity gap against relevant 
comparators like Scotland or various English regions.   
This section has considered productivity in the foundational economy and demonstrated the 
heterogeneity of activity characteristics and productivity performance. Some activities  – such as care 
and food retailing – are characterised by low output per worker but there is no simple story here about 
low productivity in all foundational activities. And no simple story about a regional productivity gap in 
foundational activities against London and the South East.  Against this empirical background, the next 
section contributes to constructive industrial policy debate by questioning the relevance of 
 
6 These sectors exclude construction, transport and financial services. The other six sectors account for 86% of 
all Welsh foundational employment covered in table 1. 
7 Data on employment used to calculate these percentages comes from the Business Register and Employment 
Survey (BRES). 
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productivity targets and measures in heterogeneous foundational activities, before focusing on the 
specific issue of low pay in some activities. 
 
The (ir)relevance of higher productivity in foundational activities 
Productivity calculations (using physical and financial measures) certainly have a place in 
benchmarking and improving competitive activities like tradeable manufacturing. Productivity levels 
and gains are relevant to competitivity, while substitution of capital for labour and/or improved 
process flow are recognised firm-level levers for increased labour productivity which will maintain or 
improve competitivity. There is then a distributive question about who captures the gains from 
increasing productivity and whether higher wages will necessarily follow from improved productivity. 
The outcomes depend on the nature and extent of market power at different points in supply chains: 
for example, product market competition amongst final producers generally ensures that cost 
reduction pressures are passed down the supply chain and the benefits will be shared with consumers 
through lower prices. 
If all this is straightforward, outside manufacturing things quickly become more complicated for policy 
makers who want to use productivity measures and targets as way of levering activity improvements. 
If they want to make effective and appropriate interventions outside manufacturing, they must 
understand activity differences and how they can limit the relevance and usefulness of productivity 
measures and targets in services, which dominate in the everyday and foundational economies, 
however they are defined. It is also important to understand, when considering the low wage sectors, 
that there is no direct and automatic link between increased productivity and higher wages in some 
of the low pay activities. 
If we consider the literature on productivity in services. The classic contribution comes from Baumol, 
who highlighted the inherent difficulty of raising productivity over time. Drawing on their analysis of 
the performing arts, Baumol and Bowen (1966) argued that it was unrealistic to expect productivity 
gains over time in many areas of personal services. While marginal technical improvements can help, 
in activities like live musical performance ‘the work of the performer is an end in itself, not a means 
for the production of some good’ (p.166) so that labour is not just an input but also the output. In such 
activities, Baumol and Bowen (1966)  argue that salaries increase despite the absence of productivity 
gains, reflecting higher wages in other industries where productivity has been improved, the so-called 
‘cost disease’.  This has led to a large literature about the extent to which some services fit the Baumol 
stereotype and others do not and matters are complicated by Baumol’s ( 1996) subsequent 
restatement. The UK evidence base is relatively limited: as Forth and Rincon Aznar (2018) note, until 
recently most of the efforts have been directed toward measurement of productivity in higher paid 
financial and business services. But there is clearly a difference between, for example, activities like 
care and those like food retailing where significant technological improvements in logistics systems 
and in-store have created the potential for productivity gains.  
The story is more complicated if we consider activities in detail because, as Griffiths and Harmgart 
(2005) caution, there are large differences in productivity levels within an activity like food retailing. 
Newer stores tend to be more productive than older ones, but size is also relevant, as is catchment 
area and other local factors. This raises the question of whether the overall service productivity 
problem is as much about a tail of low productivity firms within sectors as it is about low productivity 
sectors (and clearly size of sector here becomes especially important).  
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Thus, the ONS (2017) highlights the fact that much of the ‘tail’ of low productivity firms is comprised 
of (mainly) small firms in the large hospitality and retail sectors providing services for ‘local’ people. A 
report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Committee (2019) on the current 
industrial strategy argues that sectors like hospitality should be the focus of so-called sector deals 
because even a very small improvement in productivity would have a large aggregate effect given their 
scale. The Centre for Cities (2018) argues, however, that these  observations are a ‘red herring’ (p.16) 
because it does not lead to policy intervention. Centre for Cities contends that many of the firms that 
make up the tail – such as hairdressers and restaurants - cannot improve their productivity because 
they serve local markets with below average incomes. If so, they argue that the national productivity 
problem lies substantially with tradeable goods sectors, which show a more significant variation in 
performance across the UK. This specific point is supported by Forth and Rincon Aznar who note that 
the largest productivity gaps between the UK and competitors are in high wage services sectors which 
are more likely to be tradeable (2018, pp.21-22).  
Against this background of complexities, the conclusion must be that it is easier to measure 
productivity performance (and to attribute underperformance to deficient factor inputs or 
management quality) than it is to find policy levers that raise physical or financial productivity at firm 
and sector level.  At this point, it is worth remembering historian Jim Tomlinson’s verdict on the Anglo-
American Council on Productivity. This was the first UK government programme for productivity 
improvement which was focused on manufacturing where productivity was measurable and relevant. 
The programme failed despite considerable resources from the 1945-51 Atlee Government. 
Tomlinson argues failure was the consequence of a stalemate between ‘the desire of the government 
to do and to be seen to be doing something on productivity, whilst having little idea of what to do 
and… the desire of employers to be seen to be doing something, whilst changing their practices as 
little as possible’ (1991, p.90). In services we might add, there are more  fundamental questions about 
whether productivity comparisons are meaningful and, if higher productivity is desirable, whether 
productivity can be raised in laggard firms or activities.  
The heterogeneity of foundational or everyday activities complicates generalisation, limits the scope 
to change productivity outcomes and ensures that standard policy interventions may have perverse 
consequences that complicate the idea of ‘improvement’. The heterogeneity reflects basic activity 
characteristics, business models and the broader social, economic and regulatory context. For 
example, the foundational economy includes, at one extreme, capital intensive pipe and cable utilities 
with high productivity per worker, because product flows easily down pipes and cables after heavy 
initial investment. At the other extreme, we have labour intensive personal services with low 
productivity per worker because of the nature of the service and/or the social value we attach to it. 
And, even within the subset of low wage/ low productivity activities, radical differences of 
organisation and business model complicate the scope for policy intervention and the relevance of a 
higher productivity objective.  
This heterogeneity has implications for whether higher output or value added per worker is a 
meaningful and unambiguous indicator of improvement in foundational activities such as retail 
banking, food or utilities supply. For example, in mature retail businesses, output per worker hour can 
be improved by working on the numerator and/or denominator to improve the efficiency ratio, while 
also leaving unserved or mis-sold customers and dissatisfied workers providing worse service with no 
regard for social needs. Sales revenue can be boosted by confusion marketing which makes price 
comparisons difficult, as in supermarket special offers or multiple tariffs in utilities; or mis-selling and 
cross-selling of mortgages, pensions and personal protection insurance (PPI) in high street banking, 
with closure of retail branches or the pruning of product lines to save costs (Bowman et al., 2014). 
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Many of these perverse effects are enforced by oligopolistic competition around shared business 
models as in banking or supermarkets (Bowman et al., 2014). Similar effects arise through competitive 
bidding in activities like prison services or care when they are outsourced to financialised providers 
(Bowman et al., 2015). Whether through business model or bidding for contracts, taking labour time 
and cost out can become an end in itself, regardless of consequences for workforce or citizen service 
users. 
In foundational activities delivering personal service, the problems multiply. In some activities the aim 
of improving productivity is strictly meaningless because the observed ratio reflects a mix of technical, 
social and political characteristics that cannot practically be untangled. Furthermore, the 
numerator/denominator ratio is a matter of quantities without regard for service quality and its 
drivers, as observed by Stanley (2020). 
 If we consider the gap between low productivity residential or home care and middling productivity 
health and education, the technical cannot be isolated from its social and political conditions in 
different regimes of state funding and workforce organisation. GVA output per worker is much higher 
in health than in care for three reasons which have little to do with process organisation or 
management capability. First, health workers are credentialised, but care workers are under-qualified 
in a society which rewards educational credentials with higher pay and devalues the skills of caring. 
Second, the health workforce is unionised and dealing with a large employer in ways that give 
bargaining power that the dispersed, disorganised care workforce does not have. And, third, over a 
decade of austerity cuts the NHS health budget has been relatively protected and allowed to grow - 
albeit more slowly than in the past - while austerity cuts have severely limited local government 
funding of care. Here, existing providers depend on local authorities as the monopsony purchasers 
who cannot afford to pay more because statutory care is being rationed after decade of austerity cuts, 
even while demand for care has been rising (Localis, 2018).  
Quality adds further complications to the idea of improving productivity. Where quality of one-on-one 
or small group personal relations are crucial to service, and continuity of service worker is important, 
the use of supply teachers or home care visits by many different workers has a negative value for 
service quality not captured in point calculations of time and cost necessary to deliver the service. 
Baumol’s argument are highly relevant in care because labour remains the output as well as the input. 
As Himmelweit (2007) argues, care is a relational activity and the quality of the relationship 
deteriorates if it is spread over too many people. Moreover, where management is important to 
service quality, taking labour out is often irrelevant. In residential care, labour could be taken out 
albeit at large capital cost by rebuilding older homes. Floor layout is a significant determinant of labour 
input; a well laid out new build requires fewer labour hours per bed than a converted Victorian 
mansion. But quality of residential service delivered day by day is much more dependent on the 
commitment of the home manager than floor layout and new homes do not necessarily have better 
managers (Burns et al., 2013). Improving labour productivity here can be both self-defeating and 
largely irrelevant if we are concerned with the quality of care provided.  
Equally, productivity calculations made at a point in time and space in health, education and care will 
often be misleading because they do not capture effects down the chain or over time. Upstream 
preventive intervention against chronic illness or school failure may be cost effective as a way of 
preventing demands for remedial treatment; so that providing ever more efficient downstream 
treatment may hit the target and miss the point. Efficient high flow systems at one point often have 
perverse and unintended consequences in terms of limited resilience. Thus, the NHS hospital system 
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is in semi-permanent crisis because half the acute beds have been closed in the past 30 years and a 
highly efficient flow system is stressed and always at the edge of collapse (Froud et al., 2020b).  
In sum, the aim of higher productivity in many foundational economy sectors is not meaningful. It 
remains attractive as a policy goal because many assume that increased productivity will bring higher 
wages: this, for example, is an assumption in the Greater Manchester Local Industrial Strategy  (GMCA, 
2019a). This view is challenged by authors reviewing the recent experience of the UK. Across the whole 
UK economy in the period 2011-15, Ciarli et al. (2018) found ‘little evidence of a strong relationship 
effect’ between increasing productivity at firm, sector or local labour market level and rising nominal 
wages. There are many factors that could contribute to this finding, including labour market 
(de)regulation and high levels of workforce participation (pre covid-19). Moreover, research on the 
introduction of the national minimum wage in the UK in 1999 suggests that the causal arrow may work 
in the opposite direction from wages to productivity. Riley and Bondibene (2015) show that the 
minimum wage increased labour costs, especially in low wage firms, and that firms responded by 
raising productivity both after the initial introduction and again after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Productivity enhancements appear to have come from improved training and reorganisation, rather 
than substituting capital for labour. Such findings suggest that improving pay alongside other 
measures that cover management and workforce skills might provide an alternative route to the 
virtuous pay-productivity relation. 
The most relevant consideration here is about magnitudes not relationships. How many  foundational 
economy activities have a value added per worker which can support a living wage? We can use the 
data on output per head in table 1 to explore this. The Living Wage Foundation sets the benchmark 
genuine living wage at £9.30 across the UK and £10.75 in London in 2020,8 significantly higher than 
the legal minimum wage of £8.20. How much output per hour is necessary to pay a £10 per hour wage 
plus additional costs for employers’ national insurance (13.8% of gross pay) and a contribution to 
pensions (which could range from a minimum 3% of pay for auto-enrolled pensions to considerably 
more for a generous scheme), as well as sick pay, holiday pay and parental leave? The share of labour 
costs in value added averages 55% across the whole UK economy and varies according to business 
model, capital intensity of the activity and the relative bargaining power of capital and labour; thus 
the labour share is substantially higher in public sector activities. Overall, productivity levels of just 
under £20 per worker hour or higher should allow the payment of a genuine living wage and significant 
employer pension and other contributions. A large part of foundational activity, including food and 
drink retailing at £21 per hour, has productivity levels above this threshold; only care in our sample  - 
accounting for around 5% of the English workforce and around 6% in Scotland and Wales - has 
productivity levels below £20 in terms of GVA per worker hour.  
At a slightly lower threshold of £18/hour (living wage with lower employer pension contribution), our 
activity sample includes 25% of the total English workforce engaged in foundational employment 
above that threshold which could support decent wages and income-based liveability. For example, 
food and drink retailing, which accounts for 3.6% of English employment, could just about offer a living 
wage; it often does not because casualisation of a flexible workforce is encouraged by a deregulated 
labour market and a business model which is hostile to suppliers and workforce. Equally, activities like 
health and education which have high labour share of value added and output per hour are well above 
any threshold. Education and health  have no excuse for paying less than the living wage to anyone 
employed in the sector directly or indirectly through subcontract or outsourcing. 
 
8 See calculations at: https://www.livingwage.org.uk/what-real-living-wage 
Accepted and forthcoming in Local Economy August 2020 




 Ensuring responsible employment in activities that can afford to pay a genuine living wage should be 
one of the first priorities of public policy and suggests that industrial policy that made a difference to 
living standards needs a wider focus than productivity, as explored in the concluding section. the 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Committee (2019) report does acknowledge the 
importance of structural factors and accepts that improving productivity in low wage sectors is likely 
to require policy and sectoral interventions in addition to skills development (p.3; pp.22-6).  This may 
help to explain why, despite an original intention to have a broad base of sector deals in the 2017 
Industrial Strategy White Paper (and interest in this from the retail and hospitality sectors), the deals 
agreed have mainly been outside the everyday economy. Until some of the structural and business 
model issues outline in this section have been addressed, raising productivity in low wage service 
activities is unlikely to be successful. 
 
Conclusion   
This article has explored the relevance of productivity for the foundational or everyday economy. 
Starting with categorisations of this ‘other’ economy, a distinction has been drawn between 
approaches that identify the importance of everyday or foundational sectors in terms of their 
contribution to well-being and to the economy, and approaches that identify these sectors primarily 
as deficient in terms of their productivity. The paper has presented data on productivity by sector and 
region which highlights the heterogeneity of foundational activities and the variability of their 
productivity outcomes. These outcomes are then set in their broader social and economic context. 
While  productivity measures have their place in judging the tradeable and competitive sectors, all 
kind of problems are encountered when they are applied to foundational activities and the objective 
of raising productivity in low wage occupations needs to be reappraised.  
In considering performance and objectives we need to be more imaginative about thinking through 
what constitutes social value in each activity and what this implies for policy approaches. For example, 
in residential and home care for older people, the social value aims of reform and process 
improvement could be three-fold: paying genuine living wages; building a stock of capable enterprises 
with responsible, sustainable business models; and, treating older people as social beings not bio-
medical problems. These objectives would then need to be translated into simple performance 
indicators that provided metrics against which policy would be judged. Labour productivity (physical 
and financial), like cost of capital and much else, would be relevant background information 
understood through business model analysis, not a decision principle. In other activities, the social 
value objectives would of course be different. 
The low wage/low productivity definition of the everyday or foundational economy imports tautology 
and circularity into the definition; it also encourages the assumption that efficiency-generated 
increases in output will be captured by labour, which is not the case over the past decade in the UK. 
In policy terms it directs attention towards increasing productivity but without a very clear sense of 
how this will be done beyond generic supply side measures like training or infrastructure. This is not 
to deny that low wages are a significant problem: the foundational economy, like the other zones of 
the economy, has large pockets of low wages, employment insecurity and labour churn. But the 
financial security of low wage households depends not just on the hourly wage but on employment 
conditions, social security systems, the availability and cost of housing, a key component of the 
foundational economy (Froud et al., 2020a); while liveability more generally also depends on the 
collective provision of essential services and social infrastructure (Calafati et al., 2019).  
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A more imaginative industrial policy could focus on delivering social value, that is, delivering what 
matters to households while improving quality of life and sustainability for more households; and try 
to get this done by grounded firms with responsible business models paying decent wages. The Covid-
19 crisis has highlighted the importance of the foundational economy to keeping citizens safe and 
secure in normal and abnormal times. Industrial policy that focuses on the renewal of and support for 
these sectors requires a radical rethinking of public policy at all levels and a process of experiment 
around new objectives and metrics which is more like Roberto Unger’s social innovation (2013) than 
the UK Treasury’s idea of economic policy. Making a difference to living standards requires a broad 
set of policy tools including regulatory frameworks and social licences (Froud and Williams, 2019) for 
employers in the foundational economy. 
 
References 
Baumol, W.J. and Bowen, W.G (1966) Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma - A Study of Problems 
Common to Theater, Opera, Music and Dance. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.  
Baumol, W.J. (1996), ‘Children of Performing Arts, the Economic Dilemma: The Climbing Costs of 
Health Care and Education’, Journal of Cultural Economics, 20, 183–206. 
Bentham J, Bowman A, Cuesta M de la, Engelen E, Ertürk I, Folkman P, Froud J, Johal S, Law J, Leaver 
A, Moran M and Williams K (2013) Manifesto for the foundational economy. CRESC Working Paper 
131. Available at: https://foundationaleconomycom.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/wp131.pdf 
BEIS (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) (2017)  Industrial Strategy. Building a 
Britain Fit for the Future. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/664563/industrial-strategy-white-paper-web-ready-version.pdf 
Bowman A, Ertürk I, Froud J, Johal S, Law J, Leaver A, Moran M and Williams K (2014) The End of the 
Experiment. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Bowman A, Ertürk I, Folkman P, Froud J, Haslam C, Johal S, Leaver A, Moran M, Tsitsianis N and 
Williams K (2015) What a Waste. Outsourcing and How It Goes Wrong. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Brill L, Cowie L, Folkman P, Froud J, Johal S, Leaver A, Moran M, Williams K (2015) What Wales could 
be. CRESC Report for FSB Wales. Available at: 
https://foundationaleconomycom.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/what-wales-could-be.pdf 
Broadberry S and O'Mahony M (2004) Britain’s productivity gap with the United States and Europe: 
a historical perspective.  National Institute Economic Review 189: 72-85. 
Burns, D, Killett, A, Hyde, P, Gray, R and Poland, F (2013) How organizational factors interact to 
influence the quality of care of older people in the care home sector. Journal of Health Services 
Research and Policy, 18 (1). Suppl . 14 - 22  
Burns D, Cowie L, Earle J, Folkman P, Froud J, Hyde P, Johal S, Jones IR, Killett A and Williams K 
(2016a) Where does all the money go? Financialised chain and the crisis in residential care. CRESC 
Public Interest Report. Available at: 
https://foundationaleconomycom.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/wheredoesthemoneygo.pdf 
Accepted and forthcoming in Local Economy August 2020 




Burns D, Earle J, Folkman P, Froud J, Hyde P, Johal S, Jones IR, Killett A and Williams K (2016b) Why 
we need social innovation in home care for older people. CRESC Public Interest Report. Available at: 
https://foundationaleconomycom.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/social-innovation-in-home-care.pdf 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Committee (2019) Sector Deals Seventeenth Report 
of Session 2017–19. HC 663 March 2019. House of Commons. 
Business Wales (2019) Foundational Economy. Available at: 
https://businesswales.gov.wales/foundational-economy 
Calafati L, Ebrey J, Froud J, Haslam C, Johal S and Williams K (2019) How an ordinary place works. 
Understanding Morriston. Foundational Economy Research Report. Available at: 
https://foundationaleconomycom.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/morriston-report-v6-13-may-
2019.pdf 
Centre for Cities (2018) The wrong tail Why Britain’s ‘long tail’ is not the cause of its productivity 
problems. London: Centre for Cities. Available at: https://www.centreforcities.org/publication/the-
wrong-tail/ https://www.centreforcities.org/publication/the-wrong-tail/ 
Ciarli T, Salgado E, and Savona M (2018) Do low-wage workers benefit from productivity growth 
recovery?, Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Available at: https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/does-
increasing-firm-and-sector-productivity-drive-wages-workers 
Farquharson, C, Rasul, I and Sibieta, L (2020) Differences between key workers. Institute for Fiscal 
Studies. Available at: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/BN285-Differences-between-key-workers.pdf 
Forth, J and Rincon Aznar, A (2018) Productivity in the UK’s low-wage industries,  Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. Available at: https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/productivity-uks-low-wage-industries 
Fothergill, S, Gore, T and Wells, P (2017) Industrial Strategy and the Regions. The shortcomings of a 
narrow sectoral focus. Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam 
University. Available at: https://www4.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/files/cresr30th-
industrial-strategy-regions.pdf 
Foundational Economy Collective (2018) Foundational Economy. The Infrastructure of Everyday Life. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Froud J, Haslam C, Johal S and Williams K (2020a) Cohesion through housing. Residual income, 
housing tenure and UK regional policy. WP6 Foundationaleconomy.com. Available at: 
https://foundationaleconomycom.files.wordpress.com/2020/02/fec-wp6-residual-income.pdf 
Froud, J, Haslam, C, Johal, S, Law, J and Williams K (2020b) When Systems Fail. Available at: 
https://foundationaleconomy.com/covid-19-uk-nhs-report/ 
Froud, J and Williams K (2019) Adding value. In Reeves R (Ed) Everyday Socialism. How to Rebuild 
Britain. London: Fabian Society. Available at: https://fabians.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/FABJ7429-Socialism-Pamphlet-0819-WEB-002.pdf  
GMCA (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) (2019a) Greater Manchester Local Industrial 
Strategy. Available at: https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/media/2132/gm-local-industrial-
strategy-web.pdf 
GMCA (2019b) Greater Manchester Prosperity Review. Audit of Productivity. Available at: 
https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/media/1911/gmipr_tr_auditofproductivity.pdf 
Accepted and forthcoming in Local Economy August 2020 




Griffiths, R. and Harmgart, H. (2005) Retail Productivity. International Review of Retail, Distribution 
and Consumer Research Vol. 15, No. 3, 281 – 290. 
Haldane AG (2018) The UK’s productivity problem: hub no spokes. Speech given at the Academy of 




Himmelweit, S. (2007) The Prospects for Caring: Economic Theory and Policy Analysis. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 581–599.  
Himmelweit S (2019) Care as investment in social infrastructure. In Berry C (Ed) What Do We Mean 
When We Talk About Industrial Strategy? Manchester: Future Economies. Available at: 
https://www2.mmu.ac.uk/future-economies/publications/what-we-really-mean-when-we-talk-
about-industrial-strategy/ 
IPPR (2018) Prosperity and Justice A Plan for the New Economy. The Final Report of the IPPR 
Commission on Economic Justice. Available at: https://www.ippr.org/files/2018-
08/1535639099_prosperity-and-justice-ippr-2018.pdf https://www.ippr.org/files/2018-
08/1535639099_prosperity-and-justice-ippr-2018.pdf 
Jacobs M, Hatfield I, King L, Raikes L and Stirling A (2017) Industrial Strategy: Steering Structural 
Change in the UK Economy. Discussion Paper. London: IPPR Commission on Economic Justice. 
Available at: https://www.ippr.org/files/publications/pdf/cej-industrial-strategy-steering-change-in-
the-uk-economy-november-2017.pdf 
Localis (2018) On the Ropes. Available at: http://www.localis.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/022_OntheRopes_PRF1.pdf 
Mason, G., O’Mahony, M., & Riley, R. (2018). What is Holding Back UK Productivity? Lessons from 
Decades of Measurement. National Institute Economic Review, 246(1), R24–R35.  
McCann, P. (2019) Perceptions of regional inequality and the geography of discontent: insights from 
the UK, Regional Studies, DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2019. 
ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2017) Understanding firms in the bottom 10% of the labour 
productivity distribution in Great Britain: ‘the laggards’, 2003 to 2015. Available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/productivitymeasures/articles/
understandingfirmsinthebottom10ofthelabourproductivitydistributioningreatbritain/jantomar2017 
ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2018) The 2008 recession 10 years on. Available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/articles/the2008recession10yearson/
2018-04-30 
Reeves R (2018) The Everyday Economy. Available at: 
https://www.scribd.com/document/374425087/Rachel-Reeves-The-Everyday-Economy  
Reeves R (Ed) (2019) Everyday Socialism. How to Rebuild Britain. London: Fabian Society. Available 
at: https://fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FABJ7429-Socialism-Pamphlet-0819-WEB-
002.pdf 
Riley, R and Bondibene, C (2015) Raising the standard: minimum wages and firm productivity. NIESR 
Discussion Paper 449. London: NIESR. 
Accepted and forthcoming in Local Economy August 2020 




Stanley I (2020) Love’s Labours Found. Industrial Strategy for Social Care and the Everyday Economy. 
London: Nesta. Available at: https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/Loves_Labours_Found.pdf 
Stokes, B. (2019) Devolution 20 – The economy in Wales: time to focus on the foundations? Senedd 
Research, National Assembly of Wales. Available at: 
https://seneddresearch.blog/2019/05/07/devolution-20-the-economy-in-wales-time-to-focus-on-
the-foundations/ 
Teow, J. and Reilly, N. (2019) What drives regional productivity gaps across the UK and how can 
these be closed? PWC Economic Outlook November 2019, pp.33-52.  Available at: 
https://www.pwc.co.uk/economic-services/ukeo/ukeo-november-2019-regional-productivity.pdf 
Tomlinson J (1991) The failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity. Business History 
33(1): 82-92. 
Unger, RM (2015) Conclusion: the task of the social innovation movement. In Nicholls, A, Simon, J 
and Gabriel, M (eds) New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Waters L (2019) Fixing the foundations of the Welsh economy. Institute of Welsh Affairs (IWA) blog. 
Available at: https://www.iwa.wales/click/2019/02/fixing-the-foundations-of-the-welsh-economy/ 
Waters L (2020) It’s time to focus on the everyday economy. IWA blog. Available at: 
https://www.iwa.wales/click/2020/01/its-time-to-focus-on-the-everyday-economy/ 
Welsh Government (2017a) Prosperity For All: Economic Action Plan. Available at: 
https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-02/prosperity-for-all-economic-action-
plan.pdf 







Accepted and forthcoming in Local Economy August 2020 





Methods for calculating productivity of foundational activities by GB region  
The foundational economy includes all those activities listed by SIC code (see footnote 1). The 
calculations in this paper cover a subset of these activities, including utilities, construction, food and 
drink retailing, transport, banking, education, health and care. They do not include hospitality and 
non-food retailing which are part of the overlooked economy.  
The productivity calculation (GVA or net output per worker hour) requires an output numerator and 
a labour hour input denominator. Neither of these is available in comprehensive form from published 
sources at the level of granularity required to separate out all the foundational economy sectors. 
Therefore, the data in tables 1 and 2 is produced from published official sources supplemented by 
estimation to produce intelligible and transparent adjustment procedures.   
The primary source for output data is the ONS ‘Annual estimates of balanced UK regional gross value 
added (GVA(B))… for UK countries, NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 regions, with a detailed industry 
breakdown’9. This series directly provides regional output data for many  foundational activities like 
construction and education. But the data is insufficiently granular for our purposes when for example 
it amalgamates all of retail output without separating food and drink retailing.  
This direct data from the ONS GVA series is supplemented with estimates for two foundational 
activities- food and drink retailing and banking- which are narrower. The estimates are obtained by 
applying adjustment factors drawn from the UK input-output tables to broader ONS categories; the 
results are cross-checked for plausibility against employment figures which are directly available for 
these two sub-categories. Thus, retailing GVA was adjusted downwards by 43% to isolate food and 
drink from retailing and wholesaling. Finance employment was adjusted to fit the SIC07 category in 
the GVA tables: in effect, the banking category is modestly enlarged to include retail and investment 
banking and management of unit trusts and holding companies. These two adjustments were the only 
changes made to the publicly available data. Education in the ONS series includes all kinds of 
institutions from research universities to driving schools, but we have not separated these activities 
because employment in school teaching dwarfs the other segments.  
On labour hours worked, the primary source was the NOMIS employment data for NUTS 1 regions 
which uses the same SIC07 2-digit classification as the GVA data. The employment data is from the 
annual BRES survey which gives a workplace count of full time and part time employment and is 
broken down in the form required for employees in each foundational activity. Hours worked were 
estimated on the assumption that full time employees and self-employed work 36 hours per week, 
part time employees 16 hours per week for 52 weeks per year; the short working hours over 52 weeks 
allow for holidays and statutory days off. Different assumptions could be made but the key thing is to 
apply any assumptions consistently to all activities.  
 
Two final complications should be noted:  
a) In two cases – utilities and transport- data from several ONS categories was 
amalgamated. Utilities are not straightforward because pipe and cable distribution 
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classically so with Welsh water and the gas generated electricity (Wales is the fifth 
largest electricity exporter in the world). Therefore, utilities (including telecoms) were 
amalgamated within each region; and the total regional value of utility output against 
the total regional utility workforce hours worked were calculated. Transport output 
and employment in different categories are also combined because the numbers are 
small in some categories such as water transport. 
b) The GVA figures for residential care in the ONS series produce anomalously high 
output per labour hour in Wales because the ONS credits residential care with a 2.2% 
share of Welsh GVA which is roughly twice that in other regions, though the Welsh 
percentage employed in residential care is very similar. When queried, the ONS stands 
by this figure which we find implausible because Welsh productivity is then almost 
twice as high as in England. From knowledge of residential care in both countries, we 
believe the output per FTE care worker in Wales is very similar to that in English 
regions; and we have therefore assumed Welsh residential care productivity is equal 
to the English average of £23k or £13.14 per hour.  
 
Accepted and forthcoming in Local Economy August 2020 




Table 1: Output (GVA) per full time equivalent employee's worked hour, 2017 








East London South East South 
West 
England Wales Scotland England 
excluding 
London 
 £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour £/hour 
Utilities 114.70 80.58 98.87 84.23 112.74 87.91 120.53 105.70 101.74 101.73 98.52 107.46 98.24 
Construction of 
buildings 
38.44 36.02 39.96 58.72 50.28 60.39 90.32 58.22 60.21 58.57 31.19 34.59 51.09 
Food and drink 
retailing 
18.65 24.54 18.35 21.49 21.34 24.48 33.96 22.68 20.80 23.82 22.25 22.67 21.91 
Transport 32.16 31.89 34.71 27.25 30.70 46.62 54.59 49.81 29.08 41.08 33.37 38.64 36.33 
Financial 
services 
61.38 77.48 67.42 73.94 69.98 106.41 127.23 71.38 56.03 95.92 62.64 69.58 70.57 
Education 25.44 26.37 28.73 28.33 26.71 27.03 35.80 29.06 27.59 29.10 25.89 28.61 27.64 
Human health 28.15 27.13 28.26 27.40 26.65 30.45 32.56 28.21 29.21 28.98 25.99 30.76 28.12 
Residential care 12.89 17.87 12.43 11.37 11.72 11.05 12.87 13.82 12.20 13.12 13.12 17.10 13.14 
Non-residential 
care 
11.74 16.27 16.18 17.76 15.09 12.17 8.90 16.41 12.74 13.93 13.15 16.94 15.05 
All FE industries 
above analysed 
30.91 30.67 31.20 30.79 30.99 32.55 52.52 35.85 31.78 36.20 29.58 34.33 32.20 
All regional 
industries 
32.53 33.73 31.31 32.10 32.89 35.76 51.78 41.76 34.24 38.47 31.55 35.78 35.03 
Sources: Derived from Regional gross value added (balanced) reference tables, Table 1c 'NUTS1 & UK current price estimate', ONS and The Business Register and 
Employment Survey (BRES), Nomis.  
Notes: Utilities category includes electricity, gas, water, sewerage, telecoms; Transport includes Air, Land, Water; Non-residential care includes domiciliary care, child and 
other care. Measurement sources and estimation methods are explained in appendix A. The underlying calculations assumes a 36-hour week for a full-time employee and 
16-hour week for a part-time employee. Wales residential care rate set at the England average. 
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Table 2: Output (GVA) per full time equivalent employee's worked hour relative to England, 2017 








East London South East South 
West 
England Wales Scotland England 
excluding 
London 
 % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Utilities 112.8% 79.2% 97.2% 82.8% 110.8% 86.4% 118.5% 103.9% 100.0% 100.0% 96.8% 105.6% 96.6% 
Construction of 
buildings 
65.6% 61.5% 68.2% 100.2% 85.8% 103.1% 154.2% 99.4% 102.8% 100.0% 53.2% 59.1% 87.2% 
Food and drink 
retailing 
78.3% 103.0% 77.0% 90.2% 89.6% 102.8% 142.6% 95.2% 87.3% 100.0% 93.4% 95.1% 92.0% 
Transport 78.3% 77.6% 84.5% 66.3% 74.7% 113.5% 132.9% 121.3% 70.8% 100.0% 81.2% 94.1% 88.4% 
Financial 
services 
64.0% 80.8% 70.3% 77.1% 73.0% 110.9% 132.6% 74.4% 58.4% 100.0% 65.3% 72.5% 73.6% 
Education 87.4% 90.6% 98.7% 97.3% 91.8% 92.9% 123.0% 99.8% 94.8% 100.0% 89.0% 98.3% 95.0% 
Human health 97.1% 93.6% 97.5% 94.6% 92.0% 105.1% 112.4% 97.4% 100.8% 100.0% 89.7% 106.1% 97.0% 
Residential care 98.3% 136.3% 94.8% 86.7% 89.3% 84.2% 98.1% 105.4% 93.0% 100.0% 176.8% 130.4% 100.2% 
Non-residential 
care 
84.3% 116.8% 116.1% 127.5% 108.3% 87.4% 63.9% 117.8% 91.4% 100.0% 94.4% 121.6% 108.1% 
All FE industries 
above analysed 
85.4% 84.7% 86.2% 85.0% 85.6% 89.9% 145.1% 99.0% 87.8% 100.0% 81.7% 94.8% 88.9% 
All regional 
industries 
84.6% 87.7% 81.4% 83.4% 85.5% 93.0% 134.6% 108.5% 89.0% 100.0% 82.0% 93.0% 91.1% 
Sources: Derived from Regional gross value added (balanced) reference tables, Table 1c 'NUTS1 & UK current price estimate', ONS and The Business Register and 
Employment Survey (BRES), Nomis.  
Notes: Utilities category includes electricity, gas, water, sewerage, telecoms; Transport includes Air, Land, Water; Non-residential care includes domiciliary care, child and 
other care. Measurement sources and estimation methods are explained in appendix A. The underlying calculations assumes a 36-hour week for a full-time employee and 
16-hour week for a part-time employee. Wales residential care rate set at the England average. 
